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 1 Introduction 
Most countries have a system for allocating public funds from the central (or federal) 
government to regional and/or local jurisdictions and for redistributing revenues from higher 
to lower income areas. Reallocation of financial resources among jurisdictions is not just 
ubiquitous but also hugely quantitatively important. For example, in the UK local authorities 
(LAs) receive roughly 60 percent of their funding from central government grants (the 
remaining funding comes from the council tax, fees and charges), making LAs highly 
dependent on central government decisions. Other more centralized European countries have 
similar reallocation schemes.  
Although reallocation of higher level tax revenue to lower level jurisdictions may be 
comparably more important in more centralized economies, intergovernmental transfers are 
also hugely important in decentralized countries. For example, in the US, states’ school 
finance equalization formulas reallocate significantly more money between school districts 
than the federal government spends on Medicare or on all federal income support programs 
combined.  
If fiscal grants for a particular area increase, for reasons other than an increase in production 
costs or service needs (i.e., a windfall gain1), a non-Leviathan local government has 
essentially two options. It can either increase service quality or decrease local tax rates (e.g., 
the council tax rate in England or the property tax rate in the United States). In both cases the 
area becomes more desirable and the demand for housing rises. To the extent that the supply 
side does not fully respond to the demand shock, the primary effect of the grant should be to 
increase the value of local land and the property that sits on it. 
Little is known empirically about whether, under what conditions and to what extent 
intergovernmental transfers, and in particular central government grants, are capitalized into 
property prices. In this paper we shed light on these questions by exploring whether the 
reallocation of financial resources from the British government to LAs is capitalized into 
house prices. Estimating the causal effect of grants on house prices is challenging because 
grants are allocated through formulae that include endogeneously determined characteristics 
of the LA, such as age structure and ethnic composition of the population. To overcome these 
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 Throughout the paper we analyze windfall-type changes in grants (i.e., changes in grants that are not driven by 
changes in production costs or service needs). Compensation of differences in production costs or service needs 
across LAs is an important aspect of the British grant allocation system. 
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 endogeneity issues and identify the causal effect of grants on house prices we employ an 
instrumental variable strategy. We utilize strategic political considerations affecting grant 
allocation at the national level as a source of exogenous variation in grants.  
Our results based on panel data (over a period of 8 years between 2001 and 2008) and LA 
fixed effects as well as IV regressions suggest that an increase in the per-capita grant 
allocation indeed leads to higher house prices. Moreover, we find evidence on the positive 
dependence of the house price capitalization rate on physical constraints on housing supply 
(using elevation range measures).2 Our core estimates indicate that central government grants 
are roughly fully capitalized into property values. In a private rental housing market without 
strict rent controls, a grant-induced rise in value should be passed on to tenants in the form of 
higher rents. Thus, in areas with less than perfectly elastic housing supply, an increase in 
grants may mainly benefit typically well-off property owners, absentee landlords and 
homeowners, while leaving private renters indifferent. This mechanism may jeopardize any 
redistributive aims of the grant allocation system. 
Capitalization of central government grants may have a particular relevance in the light of the 
ongoing ‘credit crunch’ crisis. One consequence of this crisis is that public finances have 
come under enormous pressure in virtually all industrialized countries, not least in the United 
Kingdom. The crisis has also made it very transparent that public finances at all levels of 
government (national, regional and local) and housing markets are linked in complex and 
manifold ways. One consequence of the mounting pressure on public finances has been that 
governments across the globe are looking for novel and ingenious ways to raise additional 
revenue or cut spending to combat the growing budget deficits.  
In the UK in particular, the political pressure to reduce the country’s enormous public debt 
and deficit is very strong. At the same time, the incoming Conservative/Liberal Democrat 
coalition government has fond plans to devolve central power to the local level. All these 
political pressures and intended policy reforms will likely impact in a fundamental fashion on 
the way the central government allocates resources to LAs over the coming years.3 These 
changes may well cause adjustment processes on local housing markets, which in turn may 
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 We draw on earlier work by Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) who study long-term supply constraints in England. 
Hilber and Vermeulen find that house prices in England react more strongly to increases in household earnings 
in places that have tighter regulatory and physical supply constraints. 
3
 For instance, grants to LAs will be reduced by £1.165 billion in 2010-11 and several ring fences on spending 
are removed to enhance their autonomy (CLG, 2010).  
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 well have important distributional consequences. Our empirical findings that rely on past data 
imply that this is indeed likely. 
 
2 Background, testable predictions and implications 
The question of whether – and to what extent – local public spending and/or local taxes affect 
house prices has been widely studied. In a seminal paper Oates (1969) suggested that 
property taxes and public school spending are at least partially capitalized into house prices. 
Many subsequent empirical studies, whilst using better data, enhancing the methodology and 
making important qualifications, have largely confirmed this finding (see e.g. the survey 
articles by Chaudry-Shah, 1988, and Ross and Yinger, 1999; see also e.g. Palmon and Smith, 
1998, or Hilber and Mayer, 2009, for more recent evidence). A much broader set of public 
goods, services and taxes than schools and the property tax have been found to capitalize. For 
instance, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004) show that impact fees are fully capitalized into 
land values. However, the impact of central government grants – or more generally 
intergovernmental transfers – on property prices has received much less attention in this 
literature.  
The theoretical framework developed in Brueckner (1979, 1982) provides a useful starting 
point for studying the impact of grants on house prices. In this framework, a local 
government finances the provision of local public services from a local property tax, with the 
objective of maximizing the value of its housing stock.4 Following the conventional bid-rent 
approach, households (with homogeneous tastes, but heterogeneous incomes) are freely 
mobile between locations, so that they bid for units until the utility from dwelling there 
equals what they can get elsewhere. As a consequence, both the households’ marginal 
willingness to pay for local public services and the local property tax are fully capitalized into 
house prices. The local government should set the level of public expenditures such that the 
capitalized tax needed to finance a further rise in services would just offset the capitalized 
willingness to pay for them. When this condition is met, public expenditure is efficient in the 
sense that it satisfies the Samuelson condition – at the margin, the aggregate willingness to 
pay for additional services equals their cost.  
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 We ignore the role of non-residential property in this paper, since central government grants in the UK are by 
and large spent on services that benefit households rather than firms.  
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 Within this framework, lump-sum grants would enter through the local government’s budget 
constraint, while leaving its objective function unchanged. Hence, a local government would 
continue to provide public services until the capitalized tax needed to finance a further 
expansion would just offset the capitalized willingness to pay for it.5 At this optimal level of 
expenditure, additional windfall-type central government grants to a local government 
should capitalize fully into house prices, irrespective of whether the local government would 
use them to provide additional/better local public services or cut taxes. In order to see this, 
note that additional grants that are fully passed on to households through a lower tax rate 
should capitalize fully irrespective of the level of public expenditure, but at the optimal level, 
this effect should be equal to the capitalized effect of additional public expenditure. So in 
particular, full capitalization may occur even if at the margin, local governments have a high 
propensity to spend out of central government grants − an empirical regularity that has been 
dubbed the flypaper effect (see e.g. Hynes and Thaler, 1995).   
Within the Brueckner framework – assuming that at the margin the propensity to spend out of 
grants is strictly positive – the condition that the level of spending is chosen optimally is not 
only sufficient but also necessary for full capitalization.6 Suppose that for some reason 
spending on public services is below the level where it would maximize the value of the 
aggregate housing stock. This could be because of institutional constraints (e.g., property tax 
limits) or simply because local public policy is the outcome of a political process in which 
many conflicting interests interact. By implication, the capitalized willingness to pay for a 
raise in expenditure would exceed the capitalized tax needed to pay for it, and since a grant-
induced cut in taxes would capitalize fully, a grant-induced raise in expenditure would 
capitalize more than fully into house prices. By a similar line of reasoning, overspending on 
local public services would lead to less than full capitalization.  
Bradbury et al. (2002) show evidence of underspending on education in a sample of 
Massachusetts municipalities that were constrained by Proposition 2½, a law that imposes 
limits on the local property tax. More specifically, they find that municipalities that managed 
to increase school spending (by raising property taxes – grants do not play a role in their 
analysis) realized gains in house prices. The authors speculate that underspending on 
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 See Barrow and Rouse (2004) for an extension of the Brueckner framework in this vein, although they apply it 
to state education aid to local school districts rather than central government grants. 
6
 By assuming a positive propensity to spend out of grants at the margin, we rule out the situation of a local 
government that spends at a suboptimal level, but that passes all additional grants on through lower property 
taxes so that they capitalize fully. In view of empirical evidence on the flypaper effect, such a situation would 
seem unlikely to occur.  
5
 education was not only related to institutional constraints, but also to a conflict of interests 
between households with and without children. In this context, Hilber and Mayer (2009) 
document that whereas the median homebuyer outside of central cities in the US has school-
aged children, the median voter does not. Hence, house prices, which are determined by the 
marginal homebuyer, reflect a strong preference for spending on education, from which the 
median voter has few or no direct benefits. To the extent that the median voter puts more 
weight on the tax required for educational spending than on the capitalization of good schools 
into property values (e.g., in a world with imperfect mobility or attachment to homes), the 
political process may yield underprovision of educational services from the perspective of the 
marginal homebuyer.7 In such a setting, it is conceivable that local increases in central 
government grants (of which, in the UK case, a substantial part is spent on education) 
capitalize more than fully into house prices.  
However, relaxation of some of the more stringent assumptions in the Brueckner framework 
could yield less than full capitalization of grants, even if public spending satisfies the 
Samuelson condition. To begin with, the framework assumes costless mobility and perfect 
substitutability of locations. If places are inherently different and households vary in their 
appreciation for these differences, then the demand curve for living in a certain place 
becomes downward sloping: as the population grows, all else equal, the marginal homebuyer 
has an ever lower willingness to pay for living in the place. By implication, house prices 
cease to reflect the willingness to pay for local public services of inframarginal households 
(see e.g. Arnott and Stiglitz, 1979, for an early discussion of this argument), and grants that 
are spent on these services may not be fully capitalized. Furthermore, downward sloping 
demand introduces a role for supply conditions: capitalization will be stronger in places 
where housing supply is less elastic, either because of limited availability of developable land 
(physical supply constraints) or because of regulatory constraints on new residential 
development. Empirical support for the relationship between capitalization and supply 
constraints is found for instance in Hilber and Mayer (2009) for the US or in Hilber and 
Vermeulen (2010) for England. 
A second maintained assumption in the Brueckner framework is that grants are not ‘wasted’, 
for example, by generating a more complex bureaucracy or by granting higher salaries to 
public sector workers. A concise literature has proposed bureaucratic theories in this vein as 
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 Of course, as shown in Hilber and Mayer (2009), households without children do support local public schools 
because of house price capitalization, but possibly not to the same extent as the marginal homebuyer. 
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 an explanation for the flypaper effect (see e.g. Filimon et al., 1982, or Wyckoff, 1988). 
Obviously, to the extent that grants are wasted, they do not make a location more desirable 
and would thereby have no impact on housing demand, leaving house prices unaffected. 
However, in the UK LAs have little discretionary power in altering public sector wages, 
corruption is commonly perceived to be quite restrained and there is little evidence of 
bureaucratic excesses at the local level, so we would not expect local government behavior to 
be aptly characterized by such bureaucratic theories.   
Based on these considerations we can formulate two general, empirically testable predictions. 
Prediction 1: An increase in central government grants in one LA, all else equal, should 
increase house values in that location. 
Prediction 2: The increase in local house values should be larger in LAs in which housing 
supply is more constrained. 
As noted above, within the Brueckner framework, full capitalization of central government 
grants implies an efficient level of spending. Along this line of argumentation, Barrow and 
Rouse (2004) interpret their finding of full capitalization of state educational aid to local 
schools as evidence that on average, the level of public school provision is efficient. 
However, efficiency of local public expenditure is a strong claim as it requires a number of 
strong assumptions. In particular, households are heterogeneous in many other respects than 
their income, locations are not perfect substitutes and the cost of mobility is likely positive 
and varies significantly between different types of households. As discussed above, this could 
imply either more or less than full capitalization. Hence, an empirical finding of full 
capitalization could just be a combination of various opposing effects. For instance, 
heterogeneity in tastes for education could lead to underspending from the perspective of the 
marginal homebuyer (implying more than full capitalization) and at the same time, some of 
the grants could be wasted on bureaucracy (implying less than full capitalization), so that on 
balance full capitalization could not be rejected empirically. Hence, one should be cautious in 
inferring normative claims from an empirical analysis of capitalization (see also the literature 
on efficiency of decentralized local governance as surveyed in Ross and Yinger, 1999). A 
finding of positive capitalization merely rules out the case of a Leviathan government that 
wastes all grants on self-interested bureaucracy.  
7
 A finding of substantial or full capitalization also has important distributional consequences. 
In particular, capitalization may jeopardize any distributional objectives that governed the 
allocation of grants. In this vein, Wyckoff (1995) developed a simple model (with two 
communities and three income groups) to demonstrate theoretically that in the case of an 
urban area in which the central city is not large relative to the metro area, the welfare effect 
of intergovernmental aid (such as education aid) on poor voters should be expected to be 
completely offset by higher housing cost. In the UK context, adjustments in the distribution 
of grants over LAs would thus boil down to redistribution of resources between property 
owners in gaining and losing LAs without making private renters any better off − although 
aid may benefit renters in the social sector to the extent that their rents are detached from 
market rents.  
 
3 Central government grants in England 
Even though the UK is regarded as a highly centralized country, local government accounts 
for about 25 percent of the public sector expenditure (CLG, 2009). The main source of 
income for local government is grants from the central government. Grants totaled some £93 
billion in the fiscal year 2007/8 and made up roughly 60 percent of total local government 
income. Local council tax levied on residential properties is the second most important source 
of revenue with a 30 percent share. The remaining 10 percent is covered by various fees and 
charges. The size of local government, and consequently grant funding, has risen 
significantly over the past 10 years. Table 1 documents the evolution of grants in the 350 LAs 
included in the empirical analysis during the period between 2000 and 2008. Grants rose in 
real terms by 56.2 percent over the period and amounted to £1,654 per person in the fiscal 
year 2007/8. 
The data on grants used in this study is provided by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and Accounting (CIPFA). With English data, the measurement of grants received by LAs is 
not straightforward since the distribution of functions to different levels of local government 
varies across areas, and grants for different service blocks are paid to the level of government 
responsible for the block. LAs can be divided into four classes based on the structure of local 
government. The first class of LAs is London Boroughs that form the Greater London Area 
(GLA). In the GLA most services are provided at the LA level (by London’s Boroughs) but 
the upper level GLA is responsible for some services, such as fire protection, police and 
8
 transport. The second and third LA types are Unitary Authorities and Metropolitan LAs that 
have essentially a single-tier structure with only one level of local government responsible for 
all public services. However, in some Unitary Authorities and Metropolitan LAs, some 
functions take place at a strategic level through joint boards and arrangements. Typical 
services provided through joint boards are police and fire protection. The fourth group is LAs 
in non-metropolitan counties (so called ‘shire counties’) that have a two-tier structure. In non-
metropolitan LAs the higher level county councils are responsible for much of the services, 
such as education, social services and waste management, and lower level district councils 
are responsible for other services, e.g. waste collection, housing and local planning. In non-
metropolitan counties, roughly 25 percent of grants go directly to the LA and the rest go to 
the county authority. Our data includes 32 London Boroughs, 45 Unitary Authorities, 34 
Metropolitan LAs and 237 non-metropolitan LAs. Table 1 illustrates that London’s Boroughs 
get the highest grant amounts per capita and have seen the largest increases in grants between 
2000 and 2008. Metropolitan LAs and Unitary Authorities have higher grant-levels and they 
saw larger grant increases than non-metropolitan LAs.   
Grants for each service block are paid to the authority responsible for the block. Since the 
distribution of benefits of upper level grants to lower level LAs is not known, we have 
apportioned grants for upper level authorities to LAs based on population. For some Unitary 
Authorities and Metropolitan LAs upper level grants may be missing since the data lack clear 
identifiers for participation in joint boards. Roughly £8 billion worth of grants to joint boards 
were not allocated to any LA and are missing from the analysis. The apportioning of upper 
level grants to LAs and missing grants may cause some measurement error in the grant 
variable which may lead to attenuation bias in the simple fixed effects estimates of the effect 
of grants on house prices. Our instrumental variables strategy – outlined in Section 4.2 – will 
correct for the attenuation bias due to measurement error, in addition to correcting for the bias 
due to the possible endogeneity of grants.  
The English grant system is fairly complicated and there have been several changes over the 
years, leading to substantial reallocation of grants across LAs. To avoid problems of 
comparability over time, the grant variable used in the empirical analysis includes all grants 
and we do not attempt to analyze differential effects of various types of grants. The two main 
categories of grants in the current system are so called Specific and Special Grants and the 
Formula Grant. Specific and Special Grants are distributed by individual government 
departments and currently make up more than 50 percent of all grants. Specific and Special 
9
 Grants include more than one hundred individual items ranging from £29 billion to schools in 
the form of the ‘Dedicated Schools Grant’ to smaller items such as the ‘Guns, Gangs and 
Knives’ grant  (£57 million) and the ‘Rural Social and Community Program’ grant 
(£334,000). The Formula Grant allocates funds to LAs through formulae including 
population, social structure and other characteristics of authorities. The Formula Grant also 
includes a fiscal equalization component as the amount of grants is adjusted based on the 
council tax base. The equalization system does not lead to reverse causality between house 
prices and grants in a fixed effects setting since assessed property values that are used as the 
tax base are based on house prices in 1991 or 1993 and no reassessments have been made 
since then. Some of the specific and special grants are ring fenced which, at least in principle, 
means that LAs have to use the money to provide specified services, but it is not clear how 
ring fencing is enforced in practice. The Formula Grant is not earmarked even though it is 
divided into several service blocks. CLG (2008 and 2009) provide a more detailed description 
of the grant system. 
The data does not include LA level information on spending, but Table 2 shows aggregate 
local government spending by sector in 2001/2 and 2007/8. The single most important sector 
in terms of spending is education with a roughly 40 percent share of total spending. Spending 
increased between fiscal years 2001/2 and 2007/8 by about 23 percent in real terms. More 
than half of the increase was made up of education spending. As pointed out in Section 2, the 
fact that the lion’s share of grant amount increases during our sample period was spent on 
local schools is relevant for our empirical analysis. This is because the ‘marginal homebuyer’ 
– who determines house prices – likely values spending on primary and secondary schools 
more than the median voter (Hilber and Mayer, 2009). 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data 
We use panel data on 354 LAs in England from 2001 to 2008. In the empirical analysis the 
sample size reduces to 350 as LAs with missing variables are dropped. The dependent 
variable in the regressions is a local house price index constructed using transaction price 
data obtained from the Land Registry. The price index is corrected for changes in the mix of 
dwelling types, but constant quality indices cannot be constructed since the house price data 
lacks detailed housing attributes. Hence, the price measure is imperfect and may increase 
10
 standard errors but is not likely to bias estimation. Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) describe the 
construction of the price index in more detail. The explanatory variable of interest is central 
government grants per capita received by the LA (described in Section 3). 
In addition to house prices and grants, the data include demographic and socio-economic 
variables, indicators of physical constraints to new housing construction, and the number of 
council seats held by each mainstream political party. The demographic and socio-economic 
variables are used as control variables in the regressions. They include male weekly earnings 
based on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) , as well as the age structure of 
the population, the number of secondary school pupils, the number of non-white pupils, the 
number of pupils eligible for free school meals and the number of unemployment benefit 
claimants. All latter variables are derived from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The 
measure of physical housing supply constraint used in this study is the altitude range defined 
as the difference between the lowest and highest point in the LA. The underlying elevation 
raster/grid data was derived from Land-Form PANORAMA DTM. Data on council seats held 
by different parties was derived from the BBC website. We use this data to construct our 
instruments for grants. Summary statistics for all the variables appearing in the regressions 
are given in Table 3. 
4.2 Empirical specification 
In order to test Prediction 1 that an increase in grants for a LA increases house prices, we first 
estimate LA fixed effects models of the log of the house price index on grants per capita and 
control variables. Least-squares estimation of this semi-log specification minimizes the 
relative deviation of predicted from observed house prices. Hence, estimates are less sensitive 
to outliers than in a linear model, in which the absolute deviation is minimized. The basic 
model can be written as 
(1) itktrtiitittit uXGPLn ++++++= ηµγλβα)( , 
where Pit is the house price index in LA i in year t, Git  is total annual grants per capita 
received by the authority and Xit denotes other LA attributes affecting house prices. LA fixed 
effects γi capture unobserved LA attributes that are constant over time. We also include 
region-year fixed effects µrt to control for unobserved shocks that are common for a region 
and LA type-year fixed effects ηkt to allow for differential shocks in more and less urbanized 
areas. 
11
 In order to test Prediction 2 that capitalization of grants varies with physical supply 
constraints, we interact constraints with grants. The ‘interaction model’ can be written as  
(2) itktrtiitiitittit uXCGGPLn +++++++= ηµγλββα 21)( , 
where Ci is a measure of physical supply constraints. We use altitude range as a proxy for the 
ease of building new housing in the LA (see also Hilber and Vermeulen, 2010, and Saiz, 
2010).8 Regulatory constraints are not included in the analysis since Hilber and Vermeulen 
(2010) find that they are endogenously determined. The instrumental variables strategy used 
in Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) does not provide sufficient variation in regulatory constraints 
for the purposes of this study. Since altitude range is constant over time its main effect is 
included in LA fixed effects and does not appear in the equation. 
Estimating the effect of grants on house prices is challenging since grant allocation is based 
on LA attributes – such as the demographic composition – that are likely to be correlated with 
factors affecting house prices. Moreover, changes in the grant allocation policy may be 
affected by house prices or underlying determinants of house prices, which would imply that 
the grant policy is endogenously determined. Our first identification strategy is to estimate 
equations (1) and (2) by fixed effects panel regression including a flexible set of controls. In 
these regressions, identification is based on variation in grants within LAs over time, after 
controlling for region-year and LA type-year fixed effects that control for unobserved region 
and LA-type specific shocks affecting grants and house prices. In addition, we include LA 
attributes that control for endogeneity due to changes in important demographic and socio-
economic factors driving grants and possibly house prices. The LA attributes include 
variables that are associated with the burden of providing public services. Thus, if control 
variables adequately control for any increases in the burden, the coefficient on the grant 
variable should reflect the effect of a windfall type change in grants that is not accompanied 
by increases in production costs or service needs.  
Even with a detailed fixed effects structure and a good set of controls, it is likely that issues 
related to the endogeneity of the grant policy itself remain. Moreover, the approximate 
apportioning of county level grants based on population and missing upper level grants for 
some LAs participating in joint boards leads to measurement error that can cause downward 
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 We have also experimented with an alternative (exogenous) proxy for the ease of building new housing, 
namely, the standard deviation of the slope (a measure of ‘ruggedness’). Our results are virtually unchanged 
when we use this alternative measure. 
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 bias in the coefficient of grants. Attenuation bias due to measurement error is known to be 
magnified in panel data fixed effects estimation (Wooldridge, 2002). To fully address the 
endogeneity concerns and the possibility of attenuation bias due to measurement error in the 
grant variable, we employ an instrumental variable strategy, which we discuss below. 
Instrumental variable strategy 
The distribution of funds to different areas through the grant system is not only driven by 
changes in the demand for services and the costs of producing them. It is quite likely that 
political considerations play an important role. We propose an instrumental variable approach 
that utilizes political considerations affecting grant allocation as a source of exogenous 
variation in grants. In the UK, the Labour party formed the national government over the 
period covered by the data. We argue that the Labour party may have used the grant system 
to allocate more money to areas where it dominates the local council by a narrow margin.  
Our approach builds on a large literature on electoral targeting of government transfers, see 
e.g. Cox (2009) for a survey. The general idea is that these transfers, or other types of 
targetable benefits, are made conditional upon victory of the relevant candidate or party, so 
that voters are persuaded to support it. Whether transfers should be targeted at core voters, 
i.e. voters with a relatively strong preference for a party (Cox and McCubbins, 1986), or 
swing voters (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), is a major controversy within this literature.9 
However, Cox (2009) argues that the logic of targeting swing districts is more compelling 
than the logic of targeting swing voters, because it can make the difference between winning 
and losing a seat. There is no such discrete jump in rewards to a party when it sways 
particular groups of voters in a single-district setting.  
Several empirical studies support the idea that transfers are targeted to swing districts or 
regions. For instance, Wright (1974) finds that New Deal spending was higher in states in 
which voting in presidential elections was more volatile. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) 
document that the incumbent Swedish government favored regions with many swing voters 
in the distribution of grants from a program to support ecological sustainable development.  
In the wake of this literature, we argue that Labour had an interest in securing dominance in 
LA councils and that it persuaded voters by implicitly conditioning grant allocation on local 
election outcomes. Although the distribution of seats in the national parliament does not 
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 Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) provide an encompassing model.  
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 directly depend on the outcome of LA council elections10, one would expect that Labour can 
more easily realize its policy aims and secure votes in upcoming national elections in LAs 
where it dominates decision making. In LAs where the party has a very clear majority, there 
is less to gain from electoral targeting of grants. We include Labour’s share of local council 
seats as a control variable and use the following two instruments for grants to capture the idea 
of targeting LAs with marginal Labour dominance: 
- Labour’s dominance in the council (a dummy variable that gets the value one if 
Labour has more seats than Conservatives and Liberal Democrats together); 
- The interaction of Labour’s share of seats with the dummy variable for dominance; 
All else equal, Labour’s dominance is expected to have a positive effect on grants and the 
interaction of the dummy for Labour’s dominance and Labour’s share of seats is expected to 
have a negative sign. Labour’s share of seats could also have an independent positive effect 
on grants if the Labour government truly cared about the wellbeing of Labour voters. 
However, we include this variable merely as a control variable and not as an excluded 
instrument because Labour’s share may be correlated with omitted factors affecting housing 
prices. The indicator for Labour dominance and its interaction with Labour’s share of seats 
give sufficient variation in grants to identify the effect of grants on house prices. Grants 
presumably reward election outcomes and the adjustment of the grant formulae may take 
some time. Hence, we use political variables at t-2 as instruments for grants in fiscal year 
starting in t-1 and ending in t. A contemporaneous effect on grants may also be possible if the 
Labour government gets early information on shifts in Labour’s support through opinion 
polls, for instance. We also estimated the model using instruments measured at t-1 or both t-2 
and t-1 and the results were very similar. 
The formation of the council cabinet is a complicated process and it is not clear which 
number of seats gives a party the dominance in the cabinet. Hence, the definition of the 
indicator for dominance as Labour having more seats than the two other main parties is 
somewhat arbitrary. We argue that an absolute majority (over 50 percent of seats) would 
probably be an overly strict condition for dominance of the council whereas being the biggest 
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 Local elections are held more often than national elections, but their frequency differs because LAs are 
organised in different ways. In some LAs all of the councillors are elected every four years while other LAs 
elect half of the councillors every two years. Finally, in some LAs a third of the councillors are elected every 
year for three years with no elections in the fourth year. 
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 party is perhaps too loose.11 We tested other potential definitions for Labour dominance in 
the first stage regression and found that our preferred Labour dominance variable based on 
having more seats than the two other main parties together predicts changes in grants better 
than alternative measures.  
Labour dominance in the LA council and its interaction with Labour’s share are valid 
instruments if they affect house prices only through their effect on grants. We argue that other 
potential effects of changes in Labour’s dominance on prices are likely to be non-existent or 
miniscule relative to the effect through grants. One concern about the instruments is that the 
political structure of the council may lead to adjustments in local public services and council 
taxes, even if grants are unchanged, which could in turn capitalize into house prices. 
According to Brueckner’s (1979, 1982) model discussed in Section 2, marginal adjustments 
in the mix of council taxes and local public services do not affect house prices if the tax 
service bundle is close to the level that maximizes house values. Intuitively, if taxes and 
services in a LA are set at a level that maximizes house values, the marginal benefit from 
services equals the marginal benefit of private consumption and people are indifferent 
between small increases in taxes and services. By contrast, a windfall type increase in grants 
for one LA may have a big impact on local house prices as the costs are borne by the whole 
country while the benefits are local. Hence, the effect of a change in grants on house prices is 
of a different order of magnitude than the possible effect of a change in the combination of 
council tax and services due to a change in the political composition of the council.  
The instrumental variables strategy can lead to inconsistent estimates if changes in Labour’s 
dominance are correlated with other factors affecting house prices that are outside the model. 
We argue that controlling for the linear effect of Labour’s share of seats, region-year fixed 
effects and authority-type-year fixed effects together capture the most important regional 
price determinants, such as productivity and income shocks, that may be related to Labour’s 
dominance. With these control variables, the remaining variation in the instruments is likely 
to be exogenous. There is no single component of grants or type of adjustment in the grant 
allocation criteria through which we would expect the governing Labour party to support its 
local politicians. There are many ways in which the government can attempt to allocate more 
grants to LAs where it has marginal dominance. Firstly, the government can influence the 
sectoral budgets and favor sectors that are disproportionately important for LAs where its 
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 Having more seats than the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats together is not equivalent with an absolute 
majority since minor parties have seats in many LAs. 
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 support is strong but not uncontested. Secondly, the government can put more emphasis on 
allocation criteria that are important for the strategically important LAs. The government 
makes frequently numerous small adjustments to the formulae on which the allocation of 
grants is based and new Specific and Special Grants are introduced to finance various 
initiatives. We believe that the implications of these adjustments for LAs with different 
political composition are carefully examined by the government before approval when the 
proposal is in preparation. Indeed, anecdotic evidence is suggestive that the Labour 
government may have influenced the allocation in several subtle ways to channel grants 
strategically to LAs where the incumbent Labour county cabinet needs support. 12 All these 
adjustments together provide the exogenous variation in grants that the instrumental variables 
approach utilizes. 
To the extent that the instrument reflects exogenous variation in grants, the IV-specification 
will estimate the effect of a windfall type change in grants that is not offset by a change in the 
burden of service provision due to changes in the need for services or production costs. 
Maps 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship between Labour’s support and grants. Map 1 shows   
Labour’s share of seats in 2002 and Map 2 illustrates relative changes in grants per capita 
between 2002 and 2008. Areas where Labour’s support is strong often got large increases in 
grants. The first stage regressions reported in the next section show that LAs with marginal 
Labour dominance got disproportionately higher grant amounts during the sample period.  
4.3 Results 
Table 4 reports results for the base specification (equation 1), testing Prediction 1 that 
changes in grants are capitalized into house prices. The first four columns show fixed effects 
estimates without instruments and the last three columns show the instrumental variables 
estimates. The coefficient on the grant variable gives the semi elasticity of house prices with 
respect to grants per capita in the fiscal year starting in April of year t-1 and ending in March 
of year t. The units are £1,000. The control variables for demographic and socio-economic 
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 Anecdotic evidence on the Internet supports the view that political considerations affect grant allocation. See 
in particular the following quotes: “The shires still voted Tory and they have suffered for it. More money has 
been spent in Labour-controlled cities, while the means of calculating grants given to local authorities was 
fiddled to penalise the shires.” (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1560018/Gordon-Brown-urged-to-
support-UK-farmers.html; last accessed on August 26, 2010), and: “DEFRA staff have admitted that they ran 
computer projections of the results for umpteen different formulae for “needs-based” assessment of central 
government grants in order to choose one that particularly favoured Labour-controlled local authorities. These 
formulae have been repeatedly changed over the last dozen years as control of local authorities have shifted.” 
(http://www.leftfootforward.org/2010/03/tory-cheek-on-council-tax-rises/; last accessed on August 26, 2010). 
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 attributes of LAs are measured in year t-1 in order for them to better capture the LA attributes 
on which the allocation of grants is partly based. Earnings are measured in year t.  
The first column of Table 4 reports results for a specification with LA fixed effects that 
capture time invariant unobserved LA characteristics and year fixed effects that capture 
shocks that are common for the whole economy, such as interest rates. The coefficient on 
grants is positive but insignificant. In column (2) we include region-year fixed effects for ten 
regions and the coefficient rises to 0.04 and becomes significant at the ten percent level.13 
Region-year fixed effects control for changes in the overall grant-levels over time in the 
region and other regional factors. Hence, the coefficient on grants is based on changes in 
grants that are higher or lower than the average increase in the region. In column (3) we add 
authority type-year fixed effects (three authority types14) to control for the fact that more 
urban areas may have experienced different price shocks than less urbanized areas during the 
time period. The coefficient increases further to about 0.06 and becomes significant at the 
five percent level. In column (4) we add control variables that are likely to affect both grants 
and house prices. The results are roughly the same as in column (3) without controls. The 
coefficient of 0.06 implies that a one standard deviation increase (£490) in grants per capita 
leads to a 3 percent increase in local house prices.  
Overall, the results in columns (1)–(4) of Table 4 suggest that grants have a positive, albeit 
relatively small, effect on local house prices. However, the fixed effect regression results may 
be biased if there are time-varying LA attributes missing from the model that affect local 
house prices and are correlated with changes in grants per person. The instrumental variables 
regressions reported in columns (5)–(7) of Table 4 address this endogeneity issue by utilizing 
the local election outcomes to construct instruments for grants as discussed in Section 4.2.  
First stage regressions for the IV regressions in Table 4 are reported in Table A1 of the 
Appendix. Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table A1 correspond to columns (5), (6) and (7) of 
Table 4 respectively. Our two instruments, the Labour dominance indicator and its interaction 
with Labour’s share of seats, have the expected effects on grants per capita in all the 
specifications and the magnitudes of the coefficients are plausible. Kleibergen-Paap F-
statistics indicate that the instruments are strong; hence there is no reason to suspect weak 
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 The regions are: East Midlands, East of England, North East, North West, Inner London, Outer London, 
South East, South West, West Midlands, Yorkshire and The Humber.  
14
 The authority type division used is: Metropolitan LAs and London Boroughs, Unitary Authorities, two-tier 
authorities (non-metropolitan LAs). Metropolitan LAs and Unitary Authorities are typically more urbanized 
than two-tier authorities. 
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 instrument bias in the estimates. The coefficient on Labour’s share of seats, which is a control 
variable, is positive but insignificant in all the specifications.15 The dummy variable for 
Labour dominance is positive and highly significant and the interaction of Labour dominance 
and Labour’s share of seats is negative and highly significant in all the specifications. The 
first stage results indicate that LAs with marginal Labour dominance get higher grants than 
otherwise similar LAs with very strong Labour dominance or low Labour support. For 
example in column (3) the coefficients of the political variables imply that a Labour 
dominated LA where Labour holds 40 percent of seats gains £35 per person. An increase in 
Labour’s share to 50 weakens the effect to £22. The effect of Labour dominance turns 
negative when Labour’s share reaches 67 percent.  
The IV regressions in columns (5)–(7) of Table 4 give substantially higher estimates for the 
capitalization effect of grants than the simple FE regressions reported in columns (1)–(4). In 
column (5), which includes region-year fixed effects, the coefficient of grants is 0.17 and it is 
significant at the five percent level. In column (6) we add LA type-year fixed effects and the 
coefficient becomes 0.28 and is still significant at the five percent level. The inclusion of LA 
attributes as controls in column (7) does not seem to affect the capitalization coefficient, but 
the standard error increases as the instrument becomes weaker. Even after including the LA 
attributes the impact of grants is significant at the 10 percent level.  
Supply constraints  
In Table 5 we examine whether capitalization is stronger in LAs in which housing supply is 
constrained by physical barriers, which are proxied by altitude range. The first three columns 
document results for fixed effects regressions with different specifications and the last three 
columns show the instrumental variables estimates. The altitude range is standardized, such 
that the coefficient on the interaction term can be interpreted as an increase in the coefficient 
on grants if the altitude range increases by one standard deviation (171 meters). 
In the FE regressions reported in columns (1)–(3) of Table 5, both the grant variable and its 
interaction with altitude range are positive and highly significant. The positive interaction 
term suggests that grants have a more pronounced effect on house prices when new 
construction is more constrained. The results are robust to changes in the specification. In all 
the FE regressions the coefficient on grants increases from roughly 0.08 to 0.11 when the 
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 We tested the robustness of the results for dropping the Labour’s share of seats variable and the results 
remained virtually unchanged. 
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 altitude range increases by one standard deviation. Columns (4)–(6) report the IV results for 
the supply constraint model. Grants per capita and its interaction with the altitude range 
variable are instrumented with the Labour dominance indicator and its interaction with 
Labour’s share of seats as in Table 4 and, in addition, their interactions with altitude range. 
As in Table 4, the coefficient on grants in the IV-specifications is much larger than the 
corresponding coefficient in the FE-specifications. The interaction term is positive and highly 
significant suggesting that capitalization is stronger in LAs with more constrained supply. 
The relative increase in the capitalization coefficient, when the altitude range increases by 
one standard deviation, is roughly 20 percent. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 12.4 and 9.3 
in columns (5) and (6) respectively, in which more control variables are added to the IV 
specification, so there may be some small sample bias in these estimates. We also estimated 
the model by Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), which is a less precise but 
less biased alternative to the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator. The results were virtually 
unchanged. This suggests that there is no reason to suspect severe weak instrument bias in 
our estimates. Overall, the results of the supply constraint models suggest that the 
capitalization rate is substantially higher if construction of new housing is constrained by 
physical barriers. 
Capitalization rate 
Next we quantify the results by calculating the capitalization rates implied by the grant 
coefficients in Tables 4 and 5. The capitalization rate of grants can be expressed as 
(3) Capitalization rate = (β*average house value)/(average household size*£1,000/r),  
where β is the coefficient on grants and r is the discount rate. The term in the first parenthesis 
is the estimated average increase in house values when grants in an average LA go up by one 
unit (£1,000 per person). The second term is the present value of the one unit (£1,000) 
increase in grants for a dwelling with average household size. The average house value in our 
data is roughly £194,000 and the average household size in England was 2.4 during the 
sample period. We calculate the capitalization rate with three different discount rates r = 
0.03, r = 0.04 and r = 0.05.  Yinger et al. (1988) point out that the appropriate discount rate is 
the real discount rate. The average real interest rate during the period between 2000 and 2008 
calculated as the average UK banks’ base rate less inflation is roughly 3 percent. Adding a 1 
percentage point risk premium yields r = 0.04, which we believe to be our most sensible 
estimate of the discount rate. 
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 Table 6 reports capitalization rates implied by the regression coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 
with different assumptions on the discount rate. Panel A of Table 6 refers to the base 
estimates reported in Table 4. Panel B relates to the supply constraint regressions in Table 5 
and compares the capitalization rate in a LA with low altitude range (= mean – one standard 
deviation) with an LA with high altitude range (= mean + one standard deviation).16  
In panel A of Table 6, capitalization coefficients implied by simple fixed effect regressions 
vary from 0.1 to 0.25, whereas the capitalization coefficients implied by the IV regressions 
vary from 0.4 to slightly above full capitalization. The IV estimates in columns (6) and (7) of 
Table 4 are our preferred estimates for the price effect of grants. Using these estimates for β 
and the discount rate of four percent – our most sensible guess – yields a capitalization 
coefficient of roughly 0.9 suggesting that grants are almost fully capitalized. It should be 
noted that the capitalization rate is based on the assumption that the increase in grants is 
permanent. If there is uncertainty about whether the grant increase is permanent, the present 
value of the grant increase in equation (3) will be too high and the capitalization rate is 
underestimated. Hence the capitalization rate of 0.9 may well be an underestimate for the 
capitalization rate of a permanent grant increase. Overall, the point estimates suggest that 
grants may be roughly fully capitalized into house prices. The finding of nearly full 
capitalization is, however, not entirely conclusive as the confidence intervals for the 
coefficient on grants are quite broad.   
Panel B of Table 6 reports capitalization rates implied by the supply constraint regressions. 
We have selected the fixed effects estimates in column (3) and the IV estimates in columns 
(5) and (6) of Table 5 to calculate the implied capitalization rates for low and high altitude 
range LAs. The fixed effects estimates and a discount rate r = 0.04 yield a capitalization rate 
of 0.17 for the low altitude range LA and 0.34 for the high altitude range LA. The IV 
estimates are again substantially higher. Assuming r = 0.04, the IV specification without LA 
attributes as controls (third and fourth column of Panel B) implies a capitalization rate of 0.7 
in less constrained LAs and 1.17 in more constrained places. When LA attributes are added 
as controls (the last two columns of Panel B), the capitalization rate is 0.62 with low altitude 
range and 1.07 with high altitude range. The finding that capitalization rates are higher in 
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 In the lower panel we use different mean house values for low and high altitude range. They were obtained by 
running an OLS regression of mean house value on altitude range and a constant and calculating the predicted 
mean house value for the low and high altitude range. The predicted value is about £208,000 for the low altitude 
range area and £182,000 for the high altitude range area. 
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 more constrained LAs is in line with the view that LAs are not perfect substitutes and the 
demand for housing in a locality is downward sloping. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Central government grants in the UK are allocated in such a way that LAs are compensated 
for fiscal burdens associated with unfavorable demographic and socioeconomic population 
compositions. However, our identification strategy unveils that this allocation has also been 
influenced by strategic political considerations, as the Labour party targeted grants to areas 
where it gained marginal dominance after local elections. This source of exogenous variation 
in grants represents a windfall type of grant, and our empirical findings suggest that increases 
in this windfall type of grant are roughly fully capitalized into house prices. Furthermore, the 
impact of grants on house prices appears to be stronger in locations in which new 
construction is constrained by physical barriers. One implication of our findings is that local 
governments appear to use grants in ways that are valued by the marginal homebuyer. There 
is little evidence to suggest that LAs spend their financial resources largely on self-interested 
bureaucracy.  
The May 2010 elections in the UK generated a very significant political change. The new 
coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (which replaced the outgoing 
Labour government that was in power for 13 years) is likely to enact major policy changes 
that will lead to a significant reallocation of resources from the central government to LAs. 
Moreover, the political swing will likely lead to a reallocation of resources across LAs. This 
reallocation of resources represents a windfall type grant independent of whether the new 
grant system is closer to the ideal of compensating for local burden or not. Our findings 
imply that the changes at the local level will likely be capitalized into property prices. 
What are the policy implications of these changes? Property owners (homeowners and 
absentee landlords) will either significantly gain or lose, depending on whether they live in 
LAs that observe relative increases or decreases in grants. In contrast, assuming that windfall 
type grants increase rents as well as house prices, private renters should largely be unaffected 
by the changes (greater desirability is compensated by higher rents and vice versa).17 In other 
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 Whether social renters are also subject to redistribution depends on whether social rents reflect changes in the 
desirability of a LA or not. The weaker the inter-temporal correlation of social rents and private rents, the more 
affected social renters will be by the ‘redistribution lottery’. 
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 words, the grant system and changes in the allocation of grants generate substantial 
redistribution among property owners in different parts of the country, leaving (private) 
renters unaffected.  
More generally, our findings imply that the British grant system has very substantial 
unintended consequences in that it generates massive redistribution of resources without 
helping the most disadvantaged individuals as well as the less fortunate in the most 
disadvantaged places. To illustrate this argument, consider for example an increase in the 
“Guns, Gangs and Knives” grant intended to help people living in disadvantaged areas / the 
inner city poor. Our findings imply that the possible crime prevention effects or lower taxes 
would increase house prices and rents in inner cities, which are largely populated by renters. 
Beneficiaries of the change are (the few) homeowners as well as landlords who own most of 
the inner city properties. Private renters would likely not benefit from the additional funding 
because they pay via higher rents for the benefits of the grant increase. Social renters may 
benefit to the extent that the grant increase does not affect their rents. 
One policy implication of our findings is that it may be more effective and efficient to “help 
people rather than places”. In addition to the fact that the grant system has substantial 
unintended distributional consequences, these grants are financed at the national level, mainly 
with income taxes, which in turn are associated with significant deadweight losses. Our 
results suggest that lower income tax rates, less grant-induced redistribution but more direct 
help to disadvantaged people could achieve the same distributional outcome at potentially 
significantly lower cost. Such a reform could contribute towards lessening the fiscal pressures 
that have been mounting during the ongoing economic / public finance crisis.  
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 
Evolution of grants in 2000’s (in year 2008 pounds per capita) 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
% change 
2000 - 2008 
England 1059 1112 1152 1317 1500 1562 1605 1655 1654 56.2 
London Boroughs 1712 1794 1898 2222 2610 2660 2760 2848 2842 66.0 
Metropolitan LAs 1134 1199 1237 1424 1636 1711 1746 1785 1778 56.8 
Unitary LAs 1010 1061 1093 1236 1385 1456 1484 1532 1539 52.4 
Non-metropolitan LAs 835 873 898 1010 1123 1176 1208 1250 1252 50.0 
 
Table 2 
Evolution of local government spending in 2000’s (in year 2008 pounds) 
 
  
Net expenditure  
(£ million)     
  2001-02 2007-08 Real increase % Real increase (£ million) 
Education 29708 39602 33.3 9894 
Highways and transport 3471 5595 61.2 2123 
Social Services 13085 18385 40.5 5300 
Housing (rent assistance) 7419 2469 -66.7 -4950 
Cultural, environmental and planning 7313 9830 34.4 2517 
Police and fire 10827 13358 23.4 2531 
Other services 3727 3645 -2.2 -82 
Total 75550 92884 22.9 17334 
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics for regression sample 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. Dev.  
Overall 
Std. Dev.  
within Min Max 
ln(house price index) 7.467 0.229 0.185 6.581 8.567 
Grants/pop (£1,000) 1.254 0.490 0.205 0.596 4.238 
Ln(average male weekly earnings) 6.277 0.178 0.080 5.760 7.007 
Age 16-29/pop % 16.9 3.9 0.581 10.7 36.8 
Age 30-44/pop % 21.9 2.5 0.676 13.4 35.1 
Age 45-64/pop % 22.5 2.4 0.303 12.6 27.7 
Age 65 and higher/pop % 19.6 3.9 0.522 8.7 34.1 
Secondary school pupils/1,000 pop  62.7 10.8 4.933 17.5 102.3 
Pupils non-white/1.000 pop  5.4 8.0 2.484 0.1 55.7 
Pupils eligible for free school meal/1,000 pop  34.1 29.5 11.342 1.1 358.0 
Unemployment benefit claimants/1,000 pop  11.9 6.6 1.387 3.1 42.2 
Altitude range (kilometers) 0.209 0.171 0.000 0.005 0.975 
Labour's share of council seats 0.267 0.246 0.077 0 0.983 
Labour dominated LA 0.215 0.411 0.207 0 1 
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 Table 4 
Capitalization of grants 
 
  Fixed Effects regression   IV regression   
Dep. Var ln(price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Grants/pop 0.019 0.041* 0.059** 0.061**  0.166** 0.277** 0.291*   
 [0.019] [0.024] [0.027] [0.027]    [0.081] [0.124] [0.166]    
Labour's share of seats     0.02 0.022 0.022 
     [0.017] [0.017] [0.015]    
Ln(earnings)    0.009   0.014 
    [0.017]      [0.015]    
Age 16-29/pop     0.006   -0.001 
    [0.006]      [0.007]    
Age 30-44/pop     0.014   0.005 
    [0.010]      [0.010]    
Age 45-64/pop     0.021**    0.008 
    [0.008]      [0.011]    
Age 65 and over/pop     0   0.003 
    [0.008]      [0.006]    
Secondary school pupils/pop     0.001**    0.001*** 
    [0.000]      [0.000]    
Non-white pupils/pop     -0.003***   -0.005*** 
    [0.001]      [0.002]    
Free school meal eligibility/pop     -0.001*     -0.001*** 
    [0.001]      [0.000]    
Benefit claimants/pop     -0.007***   -0.008*** 
    [0.001]      [0.001]    
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Local authority fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region*year fixed effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LA type*year fixed effects   YES YES  YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap first stage F      43.5 22.7 16.8 
Hansen's J (p-value)     0.278 0.364 0.495 
N 2446 2446 2446 2446 2439 2439 2439 
R-sq, within 0.916 0.967 0.967 0.969 0.966 0.964 0.967 
Robust standard errors in brackets        
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01        
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 Table 5 
Capitalization of grants and physical supply constraints 
 
 
  Fixed Effects regression IV regression   
Dep. Var ln(price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Grants/pop 0.077*** 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.249*** 0.295** 0.267 
 [0.026] [0.028] [0.027]    [0.090] [0.126] [0.162]    
Altitude range*Grants/pop 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]    [0.019] [0.021] [0.020]    
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Local authority fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region*year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LA type*year fixed effects  YES YES  YES YES 
Control variables   YES   YES 
Kleibergen-Paap first stage F     20.5 12.4 9.3 
Hansen's J (p-value)    0.911 0.942 0.887 
N 2446 2446 2446 2439 2439 2439 
R-sq, within 0.968 0.968 0.97 0.965 0.964 0.967 
Robust standard errors in brackets       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01       
 
 
Table 6 
Quantitative effects (capitalization rates with different assumptions) 
 
Panel A: base regressions         
Table/Coulmn 4/2 4/3 4/4 4/5 4/6 4/7 
Model FE FE FE IV IV IV 
Coefficient 0.041 0.059 0.061 0.166 0.277 0.291 
Capitalization rate if r = 0.05 0.166 0.238 0.247 0.671 1.120 1.176 
Capitalization rate if r = 0.04 0.133 0.191 0.197 0.537 0.896 0.941 
Capitalization rate if r = 0.03 0.099 0.143 0.148 0.403 0.672 0.706 
Panel B: altitude range regressions    
Table/Coulmn 5/3 5/3 5/5 5/5 5/6 5/6 
Model FE FE IV IV IV IV 
Altitude range* Low High Low High Low High 
Coefficient 0.053 0.111 0.203 0.387 0.18 0.354 
Capitalization rate if r = 0.05 0.214 0.421 0.880 1.467 0.780 1.342 
Capitalization rate if r = 0.04 0.171 0.337 0.704 1.174 0.624 1.074 
Capitalization rate if r = 0.03 0.129 0.253 0.528 0.880 0.468 0.805 
* Low altitude range = mean – std. dev. and high altitude range = mean + std. dev. 
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 MAPS 
 
 
Map 1 
Labour’s share of council seats in 2002 
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 Map 2 
Relative changes in grants per capita 2002 – 2008 (nominal) 
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 APPENDIX TABLES 
 
 
Table A1 
First stage of IV corresponding to Table 4 
 
 
Dep. Var grants/pop (1) (2) (3) 
Labour dominance 0.185*** 0.123*** 0.089*** 
 [0.036] [0.030] [0.022]    
Labour dominance* Labour's share of seats -0.364*** -0.238*** -0.152*** 
 [0.069] [0.060] [0.044]    
Labour's share of seats 0.044 0.019 0.018 
 [0.048] [0.041] [0.033]    
Ln(earnings)   -0.021 
   [0.023]    
Age 16-29/pop    0.038*** 
   [0.011]    
Age 30-44/pop    0.065*** 
   [0.022]    
Age 45-64/pop    0.061*** 
   [0.015]    
Age 65 and higher/pop    -0.002 
   [0.014]    
Secondary school pupils/pop    -0.001*   
   [0.000]    
Pupils non-white/pop    0.009**  
   [0.004]    
Pupils eligible for free school meal/pop    0 
   [0.000]    
Unempl. benefit claimants/pop    0.001 
   [0.002]    
Local authority fixd effects YES YES YES 
Region*year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Authority type*year fixed effects  YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap first stage F  43.5 22.7 16.8 
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.91 0.94 0.89 
N 2439 2439 2439 
R-sq, within 0.945 0.956 0.959 
Robust standard errors in brackets    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
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